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Abstract—The techniques generally used to detect compro-
mising emanations are based on a wide-band receiver tuned
on a specific frequency or a spectral analyzer with a limited
bandwidth. However, these methods may not be optimal since
a significant amount of information is lost during the signal
acquisition. In this paper, we propose a straightforward but
efficient approach which acquires raw signal directly from the
antenna and processes the entire captured electromagnetic spec-
trum thanks to the computation of short time Fourier transforms.
We applied this approach to detect potential compromising
electromagnetic emanations radiated by modern keyboard. Since
keyboards are often used to transmit confidential data such
as passwords, these emanations could remotely reveal sensitive
information such as keystrokes. Thanks to this method, we
detected four different kinds of compromising electromagnetic
emanations generated by wired and wireless keyboards. These
emissions lead to a full or a partial recovery of the keystrokes.
We implemented these side-channel attacks and our best practical
attack fully recovered 95% of the keystrokes of a PS/2 keyboard
at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the practical attacks on computers exploit software
vulnerabilities from both operating systems and third party
software. Every day, dozens of new security weaknesses are
discovered and disclosed. To reduce this risk, patches and
workarounds are commonly delivered within a few days by the
company developing the flawed products. Since a few years,
most of the software tend to use online update processes to
automatically deliver these patches and to secure computers
as fast as possible.
When a vulnerability is based on hardware, there is some-
times no firmware update to avoid the exposure: the device
must be changed. Because of the cost of the device or
due to the lack of the user awareness (no automatic update
process), vulnerable hardware is not replaced quickly and the
vulnerability may stay exploitable for a long time.
Thus, there are two main interests for an attacker to focus
his research on hardware security. Contrarily to software-
based weaknesses, hardware vulnerabilities may be exploited
for a much longer period of time. Additionally, side chan-
nel cryptanalysis is an interdisciplinary study which requires
knowledges in different fields. Academic researchers tend to
become specialists focused on a specific domain. Hence, an
attacker may easily find new weaknesses in interdisciplinary
fields, since they are less studied.
II. ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNAL ACQUISITION
Detecting and capturing unattended electromagnetic emana-
tions is not a new research field.
A. Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMC defines two kinds of unwanted emissions: conductive
coupling and radiative coupling. Conductive coupling requires
physical support such as electric wires to transmit interferences
through the system. Radiative coupling occurs when a part of
the internal circuit acts as an antenna and transmits undesired
electromagnetic waves. EMC generally distinguishes two types
of electromagnetic emissions depending on the kind of the
radiation source: differential-mode and common-mode.
1) Differential-mode: Differential-mode radiation is gener-
ated by loops formed with components, printed circuit traces,
ribbon cables, etc. These loops act as small circular antennas
and eventually radiate. These radiations are generally low and
do not disturb the whole system. Differential-mode signals are
not easily influenced by external radiations. Moreover they can
be easily avoided by shielding the system.
2) Common-mode: Common-mode radiation is the result of
undesired internal voltage drops in the circuit which usually
appear in the ground loop. Indeed, ground loop currents are
due to the unbalanced nature of ordinary transmitting and
receiving circuits. Thus, external cables included in the ground
loop act as antennas excited by some internal voltages.
Note that the undesired common-mode currents that are
found on external cables can be some percentage of the signal
currents that would normally be expected on this interface
but, more often, cables are found to carry high-frequency
harmonics that are not at all part of the intentional signal.
Rather they have been picked up inside the equipment from
internal clock signal or its harmonics by crosstalk, ground
pollution or power supply DC pollution.
Mardiguian in [1] concludes that the identification of the
common-mode current source is so complicated, that it is often
only during FCC [2], CISPR [3], MIL-STD-461 [4] or other
compliance testing that they are discovered.
B. EM from an Attacker’s Point of View
From the attacker’s point of view there is a simpler way
to describe these radiations. Indeed, the attacker has no real
interest to determine the source of the emanations, since he
aims only at exploiting them. He may look for correlations
between the signal carrying the sensitive information and the
compromising emissions. Thus, we redefine the classification
of these compromising electromagnetic emanations accord-
ingly.
1) Direct Emanations: In digital devices, data is encoded
with logic states, generally described by short burst of square
waves with sharp rising and falling edges. During the transition
time between two states, electromagnetic waves are eventually
emitted at a maximum frequency related to the duration of
the rise/fall time. Because these compromising radiations are
provided straight by the wire transmitting sensitive data, they
are called direct emanations.
2) Indirect Emanations: Electromagnetic emanations may
interact with active electronic components which induce new
types of radiations. These unintended emanations manifest
themselves as modulations or inter-modulations (phase, am-
plitude or frequency) or as carrier signals e.g. clock and its
harmonics. Non-linear coupling between carrier signals and
sensitive data signals, crosstalk, ground pollution or power
supply DC pollution may generate compromising modulated
signals. These indirect emanations may have better propaga-
tion than direct emanations. Hence, they may be captured at a
larger range. The prediction of these emanations is extremely
difficult because they are mainly based on common-mode
radiations.
III. STANDARD METHOD FOR SIGNAL ACQUISITION
In this section, we define two commonly used techniques
to discover compromising electromagnetic emanations. These
methods come from the electromagnetic compatibility stan-
dards.
A. Spectral Analyzer
A method consists in using a spectral analyzer to detect
signal carriers. Such a signal can be caught only if the
duration of the carrier is significant. This makes compromising
emanations composed of peaks difficult to detect with spectral
analyzers.
B. Wide-band Receiver
Another method is based on a wide-band receiver tuned
on a specific frequency. Signal detection process consists
in scanning the whole frequency range of the receiver and
demodulate the signal according to its amplitude modulation
(AM) or frequency modulation (FM). When an interesting fre-
quency is discovered, narrow-band antennas and some filters
are used to improve the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the
compromising emanations. In practice, wide-band receivers
such as R-1250 [5] and R-1550 [6] from Dynamic Sciences
International, Inc. are used, see [7], [8]. Indeed, these receivers
are compliant with secret requirements NACSIM-5000 [9] also
known as TEMPEST.
These devices are quite expensive and unfortunately not
owned by our lab. Hence, we used a cheaper and open-
source solution based on the USRP (Universal Software Radio
Peripheral) [10] and the GNU Radio project [11].
IV. FULL SPECTRUM ACQUISITION TECHNIQUE
Some direct and indirect electromagnetic emanations may
stay undetected with standard techniques, especially if the
signal is composed of irregular peaks or erratic frequency
carriers. Indeed, spectral analyzers need significantly static
carrier signals. Similarly, the scanning process of wide-band
receivers is not instantaneous and needs a lot of time to
cover the whole frequency range. Moreover the demodulation
process may hide some interesting compromising emanations.
In this research, we used a different method to detect
compromising electromagnetic emanations of keyboards. First,
we obtain the raw signal directly from the antenna instead of a
filtered and demodulated signal with limited bandwidth. Then,
we compute the Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT), which
gives a 3D signal with time, frequency and amplitude.
Modern analog-to-digital converters (ADC) provide very
high sampling rates (Giga samples per second). If we connect
an ADC directly to a wide-band antenna, we can import the
raw sampled signal to a computer and we can use software
radio libraries to instantly highlight potentially compromising
emanations. The STFT computation of the raw signal reveals
the carriers and the peaks even if they are present only for a
short time.
Unfortunately there is no solution to transfer the high
amount of data to a computer in real time. The data rate is
too high for USB 2.0, IEEE 1394, Gigabit Ethernet or Serial
ATA (SATA) interfaces. However, with some smart triggers,
we can sample only the (small) interesting part of the signal
and we store it in a fast access memory.
Oscilloscopes provide triggered analog-to-digital converters
with fast memory. We used a Tektronix TDS5104 with 1
Mpt memory and a sample rate of 5 GS/s. It can acquire
electromagnetic emanations up to 2.5 GHz according to the
Nyquist theorem. Moreover, this oscilloscope has antialiasing
filters and supports IEEE 488 General Purpose Interface Bus
(GPIB) communications. We developed a tool to define some
specific triggers (essentially peaks detector) and to export the
acquired data to a computer under GNU/Linux over Ethernet.
Hence, the signal can be processed with the GNU Radio
software library and some powerful tools such as Baudline [12]
or the GNU project Octave [13].
The advantage of this method is to process the raw signal,
which is directly sampled from the antenna without any
demodulation. Moreover, all compromising electromagnetic
emanations up to a frequency of 2.5 GHz are captured1. Thus,
with this technique, we are able to highlight compromising
emanations quickly (with only one capture) and easily (with
a visual representation of the signal). This solution is ideal
for very short data burst transmissions used by computer
keyboards.
A. Using an ADC with Fast Data Storage
Since oscilloscopes have limited memory, we implemented
a data storage system based on RAM and linked to an ADC.
1Multiple antenna models may be used to cover the entire spectrum without
any signal loss.
Thus, compared to the previous solution, storage is only
limited by the amount of RAM. With this system, we are able
to capture a large portion of the electromagnetic spectrum for
seconds instead of milliseconds.
B. Removing Antialiasing Filter
To improve the detection of frequencies higher than the
bandwidth, we removed all antialiasing filters, to have a
wider spectrum. Remember that our objective is to exploit
compromising electromagnetic emanations, not to identify the
source of these radiations.
V. CASE STUDY: MODERN KEYBOARDS
To provide a practical example of the technique described
above, we analyzed the compromising electromagnetic ema-
nations of modern keyboards (both wired and wireless).
A. Experimental Setup
Obviously electromagnetic emanations depend on the envi-
ronment. We defined four different setups.
a) The Semi-Anechoic Chamber (Setup 1): We used a
professional semi-anechoic chamber (7 × 7 meters). The an-
tenna was placed up to 5 meters from the keyboard connected
to a computer (the maximum distance according to the echo
isolation of the room). The tested keyboard was on a one meter
high table and the computer (PC tower) was on the ground.
b) The Office (Setup 2): To give evidence of the feasi-
bility of the attacks with background noise, we measured the
compromising emanations of the keyboards in a small office
(3 × 5 meters)
c) The Adjacent Office (Setup 3): This setup is similar
to the office setup but we measured the compromising emana-
tions of the keyboards from an adjacent office through a wall
of 15 cm composed of wood and plaster.
d) The Building (Setup 4): This setup takes place in a
flat which is in a building of five floors in the center of a
mid-size city.
e) Antennas: We mainly used a biconical antenna (50
Ohms VHA 9103 Dipol Balun) to improve the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR). We also tested if these compromising emanations
can be captured with a smaller antenna such as a simple
loop made of a wire of copper (one meter long). Indeed, our
objective was to demonstrate that easy-to-hide antennas can
be used as well.
f) Keyboards: We picked more than 30 keyboards which
share 12 different models present in our lab: 7 PS/2 keyboards
(Keyboard A1-A7), 2 USB keyboards (Keyboard B1-B2), 2
Laptop keyboards (Keyboard C1-C2) and 1 wireless keyboard
(Keyboard D1). They were all bought between 2001 and 2008.
g) Power Supply: To guarantee that only electromagnetic
emanations were exploited, we collected measurements with
the keyboard connected to a laptop with battery.
B. Discovering Compromising Emanations
To discover compromising emanations, we placed Keyboard
A1 in the semi-anechoic chamber and we used the biconical
antenna. We acquired the raw signal with the method described
above.
Figure 1 gives the STFT of the captured raw signal when
the key E is pressed on an American keyboard. With only one
capture, we are able to represent the entire spectrum along the
full acquisition time. In addition, we have a visual description
of all electromagnetic emanations. In particular we clearly see
some carriers (vertical lines) and broadband impulses (hori-
zontal lines). The three first techniques to recover keystrokes
are based on these compromising emanations and are detailed
in the following sections. They can all be discovered from this
figure.
Fig. 1. Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT) up to 250 MHz of the
compromising electromagnetic emanation of Keyboard A1 when the key E is
pressed (Kaiser windowing of 40, 65536 points).
Some keyboards continuously emit electromagnetic emana-
tions, even when no key is pressed. These radiations were
detected with our method as well and are depicted in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT) up to 250 MHz of the
continuously radiated compromising electromagnetic emanation of Keyboard
A7 when no key is pressed (Kaiser windowing of 40, 65536 points).
With these two figures, we are able to discover and de-
scribe four different techniques to fully or partially recover
keystrokes from PS/2, USB, laptop and wireless computer
keyboards. The next step is to exploit these emanations. Our
first approach was to highlight potential direct emanations.
It means that we tried to correlate these radiations with the
internal protocol used in keyboards.
VI. EXPLOITING COMPROMISING EMANATIONS
To understand how direct compromising electromagnetic
emanations may be generated by keyboards, we need to briefly
describe the PS/2 communication protocol.
When a key is pressed, released or held down, the keyboard
sends a packet of information known as a scan code to the
computer. The protocol used to transmit these scan codes is a
bi-directional serial communication, based on four wires: Vcc
(5 volts), ground, data and clock. For each byte of the scan
code, the keyboard pulls down the clock signal at a frequency
between 10 kHz and 16.7 kHz for 11 clock cycles. When
the clock is low, the state of the signal data is read by the
computer. The 11 bits sent correspond to a start bit (0), 8
bits for the scan code of the pressed key (least significant bit
first), an odd parity check bit on the byte of the scan code
and finally a stop bit (1). Note that the scan code is binded
to a physical button on the keyboard, it does not represent
the character printed on that key. For instance, the scan code
of E is 0x24 if we consider the American layout keyboard.
Figure 3 represents data, clock signals and the signal captured
by a simple wire of copper (one meter long as antenna) when
the key E is pressed. We notice that the falling edges of both
clock and signal data radiate some compromising peaks. They
correspond to the horizontal lines in Figure 1. The exploitation
of these peaks defines the first keystroke recovery technique.
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Fig. 3. Data, clock and the compromising emanation captured (semi-anechoic
chamber, Keyboard A1) with the loop antenna at 5 meters (a wire of copper,
one meter long) when the key E (0x24) is pressed. Data signal sends the
message: 0 00100100 1 1.
A. The Falling Edge Transition Technique (FETT)
Logic states given by data and clock signals in the keyboard
are usually generated by an open collector coupled to a pull-up
resistor. The particularity of this system is that the duration of
the rising edge is significantly longer (2 µs) than the duration
of the falling edge (200 ns). Thus, the compromising ema-
nation of a falling edge should be much more powerful (and
with a higher maximum frequency) than the rising edge. This
property is known and has been already noticed by Kuhn [7,
p.35]. Clock and data signals are identically generated. Hence,
the compromising emanation detected is the combination of
both signals. However (see Figure 3), the edges of the data
and the clock lines are not superposed. Thus, they can be
easily separated to obtain independent signals.
h) Collisions: Because only the falling edges are de-
tected, eventually collisions occur during the keystroke recov-
ery process. For instance, both E (0x24) and G (0x34) share
the same trace if we consider only falling edges. We define
the falling edge trace as ‘2’ when both data and clock peaks
are detected and ‘1’ when only a clock peak is captured. The
letters E (see lower graph in Figure 3) and G may be described
by the string 21112112111.
Even if collisions appear, falling edge traces may be used to
reduce the subset of possible transmitted scan codes. Indeed,
the average number of potential characters for a falling edge
trace is 2.4222 (2.0556 if we consider only alpha-numeric
characters and a uniform distribution). For example, an at-
tacker who captured the falling edge-based trace of the word
password obtains a subset of 3 · 2 · 3 · 3 · 2 · 6 · 2 · 6 = 7776
potential words. Thus, if the objective of the attacker is to
recover a secret password, he has significantly reduced the test
space (the initial set of 368 ≈ 241 is lowered to 213). Moreover,
if the eavesdropped information concerns an e-mail or a text
in English, the plaintext recovery process can be improved by
selecting only words contained in a dictionary.
B. The Generalized Transition Technique (GTT)
The previously described attack is limited to a partial
recovery of the keystrokes. However, it may be possible to
improve the attack. We know that between two ’2’ traces,
there is exactly one data rising edge. Indeed, the data signal is
pulled up exactly one time between two falling edges. Thus,
if we are able to detect when this transition occurs, we can
fully recover the keystrokes.
To highlight potential compromising emanations on the data
rising edge, we use a software band-pass filter on the raw
signal to isolate the frequencies of the broadband impulses
(e.g. 105 MHz to 165 MHz of the raw signal in Figure 1).
Our objective is to visually highlight some information on the
rising edge of the data signal.
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Fig. 4. Band-pass (105-165 MHz) filtered signal of Figure 3.
We notice that the energy of the peaks generated by the
falling edges of the clock is not constant. Empirically, clock
peaks have more energy (i.e. the peaks are higher) when the
state of data signal is high. Indeed, the data signal pull-up
resistor is open. When the clock signal is pulled down, the
surplus of energy creates a stronger peak. Hence, the peaks
generated by the falling edge of the clock signal intrinsically
encode the logic state of the data signal. Because there is
exactly one rising edge between two falling edge traces of ’2’,
we simply consider the highest clock peak as the rising edge
data transition. For example in Figure 4, the rising edge data
transitions are respectively at the 5th and the 9th peaks. Thus,
the complete data signal is 0010 0100 which corresponds
to E (0x24).
C. The Modulation Technique (MT)
Figure 1 draws attention to carriers with harmonics (vertical
lines between 116 MHz and 147 MHz). These compro-
mising electromagnetic emissions come from unintentional
emanations such as radiations emitted by the clock, non-
linear elements, crosstalk, ground pollution, etc. Determining
theoretically the reasons of these compromising radiations is
a very complex task. Thus, we can only sketch some probable
causes. The source of these harmonics corresponds to a carrier
of fundamental frequency of 4 MHz, which is very likely the
internal clock of the microcontroller inside the keyboard.
If we correlate these harmonics with both clock and data
signals (see Figure 5), we clearly see modulated signals (in
amplitude and frequency) which fully describe the state of
both clock and data signals. This means that the scan code
can be completely recovered from these harmonics.
Fig. 5. The amplitude and frequency modulations of the harmonic at 124
MHz correlated to both data and clock signals (Keyboard A1, semi-anechoic
chamber at 5 meters).
D. The Matrix Scan Technique (MST)
The techniques described above are related to the use of
PS/2 and some laptop keyboards. However, new keyboards
tend to use USB or wireless communication. In this section,
we present another compromising emanations which concern
all keyboard types: PS/2, USB, Notebooks and even wireless
keyboards. This attack was previously postulated by Kuhn and
Anderson [14] but no practical data has appeared so far in the
open literature.
Columns in the matrix are long leads since they connect sev-
eral keys. According to [15], these columns are continuously
pulsed one-by-one for at least 3µs. Thus, these leads may
act as an antenna and generate electromagnetic emanations.
If an attacker is able to capture these emanations, he can
easily recover the column of the pressed key. Indeed, the pulse
following the pressed column will be delayed by the time taken
to process the scan code transmission.
To figure out if these emanations can be captured, we picked
Keyboard A6 and acquired the signal being one meter from
the keyboard in the semi-anechoic chamber with a simple one
meter long wire of copper as antenna. Figure 6 shows the
compromising emanations when the key C resp. key H is
pressed.
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Fig. 6. The matrix scan emanations for the letters C and H (Keyboard A6,
Setup 1 at 1 meter).
The key matrix arrangement may vary, depending on the
manufacturer and the keyboard model.
Even if this signal does not fully describe the pressed key,
it still gives partial information on the transmitted scan code,
i.e. the column number. Thus, as described in the Falling Edge
Transition Technique, collisions occurs between key codes.
Note that this attack is less efficient than the first one since it
has (for this specific keyboard) in average 5.14286 potential
key codes for a keystroke (alpha-numeric only). However, an
exhaustive search on the subset is still a major improvement.
Note that the matrix scan routine loops continuously. When
no key is pressed, we still have a signal composed of multiple
equidistant peaks. These emanations may be used to remotely
detect the presence of powered computers.
VII. RESULTS
We consider an attack as successful when we are able to
correctly recover more than 95% of more than 500 keystrokes.
A. Semi-Anechoic Chamber
The Falling Edge Transition Technique, the Generalized
Transition Technique and the Modulation Technique are suc-
cessful in the semi-anechoic chamber for all vulnerable key-
boards. This means that we can recover the keystrokes (fully
or partially) to at least 5 meters (the maximum distance inside
the semi-anechoic chamber). The Matrix Scan Technique is
limited to a range of 2 to 5 meters, depending on the keyboard.
Considering 6 dB of SNR as a minimum, we are able to
estimate the theoretical maximum distance to successfully
recover the keystrokes for all techniques in the semi-anechoic
chamber. Figure 7 gives the estimated maximum distance
range according to the weakest and the strongest keyboard.
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Fig. 7. The theoretically estimated maximum distance range to successfully
recover 95% of the keystroke according the four techniques in the semi-
anechoic chamber, from the less vulnerable to the most vulnerable keyboard.
B. The Office (Setup 2)
All the results are summarized in Figure 8, which gives the
maximum range for the four techniques measured in the office.
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Fig. 8. Maximum distance ranges, from the least vulnerable keyboard to
the most vulnerable keyboard, to successfully recover 95% of the keystroke
according to the techniques (in the office with the biconical antenna).
C. The Adjacent Office (Setup 3)
Results on this setup are basically the same as the previous
setup (the office), except that the wall made of plaster and
wood removes 3 dB to the SNR.
D. A Flat in a Building (Setup 4)
We notice some unexpected results in this setup. Indeed,
we are able to capture the signal and successfully recover the
keystroke with a probability higher than 95% 20 meters away
from the keyboard (i.e. the largest distance inside the building).
Sometimes the environment can be extremely favorable to
the eavesdropping process. For example, metallic structures
such as pipes or electric wires may act as antennas and
significantly improve the eavesdropping range. In this case, the
compromising emanations are carried by the shared ground of
the electric line. Thus, the range is defined by the distance
between the keyboard and the shared ground and the distance
between the shared ground and the antenna.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have provided evidence that modern keyboards radiate
compromising electromagnetic emanations. The four tech-
niques presented in this paper prove that these inexpensive
devices are generally not sufficiently protected against com-
promising emanations. Additionally, we show that these ema-
nations can be captured with relatively inexpensive equipment
and keystrokes are recovered not only in the semi-anechoic
chamber but in some practical environments as well.
The discovery of these attacks was directly related to our
method based on the analysis of the entire spectrum and
the computation of Short Time Fourier Transform. The main
interest of this technique is the human-aided visual detection of
potential compromising electromagnetic emanations. Indeed,
once these signals identified, it is trivial to develop some filters
which efficiently recover the sensitive information. But with
this technique, we are able to interpret these signals quickly
and intuitively with our eyes and our brain.
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